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Abstract
Background: Global health policy is created largely through a collaborative process between development 
agencies and aid-recipient governments, yet it remains unclear whether governments retain ownership over 
the creation of policy in their own countries. An assessment of the power structure in this relationship and its 
influence over agenda-setting is thus the first step towards understanding where progress is still needed in policy-
making for development.
Methods: This study employed qualitative policy analysis methodology to examine how health-related policy 
agendas are adopted in low-income countries, using Tanzania as a case study. Semi-structured, in-depth, key 
informant interviews with 11 policy-makers were conducted on perspectives of the agenda-setting process and 
its actors. Kingdon’s stream theory was chosen as the lens through which to interpret the data analysis.
Results: This study demonstrates that while stakeholders each have ways of influencing the process, the power 
to do so can be assessed based on three major factors: financial incentives, technical expertise, and influential 
position. Since donors often have two or all of these elements simultaneously a natural power imbalance ensues, 
whereby donor interests tend to prevail over recipient government limitations in prioritization of agendas. One 
way to mediate these imbalances seems to be the initiation of meaningful policy dialogue. 
Conclusion: In Tanzania, the agenda-setting process operates within a complex network of factors that interact 
until a “policy window” opens and a decision is made. Power in this process often lies not with the Tanzanian 
government but with the donors, and the contrast between latent presence and deliberate use of this power seems 
to be based on the donor ideology behind giving aid (defined here by funding modality). Donors who used 
pooled funding (PF) modalities were less likely to exploit their inherent power, whereas those who preferred 
to maintain maximum control over the aid they provided (ie, non-pooled funders) more readily wielded their 
intrinsic power to push their own priorities. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Power is a complex notion involving political forces that should not be overlooked in international policy-making; on the contrary, power 
should be analyzed and carefully considered throughout the process.
• Donors who wish to negotiate with low-income country governments on the aid they provide should keep in mind that simply being ‘the 
donor’ provides them with an inherent power advantage over recipient governments.
• Low-income country governments should recognize and capitalize on their ability to negotiate for their own priorities, regardless of donor 
funding modality.
• Of the three major sources of power in policy-making, technical expertise is the simplest to improve in low-income countries. As such, 
governments should encourage evidence-based decision-making and emphasize the need for strong national research programs.
• Aid is intrinsically fungible so policy-makers should work together to identify solutions that maximize the effectiveness of additional financial 
flows to the health sector.
Implications for public
Policy-making in low-income countries is affected a great deal by international socio-political forces. It is important to keep in mind that 
throughout the process of policy creation, power is wielded in various ways in order to push certain agendas. This power is inherently understood, 
but not always widely discussed. A greater understanding of the use (or abuse) of power in policy-making is important in order to ensure that aid 
is as effective as possible and that low-income countries (and their poverty-stricken beneficiaries) are reaping the maximum possible benefit from 
these transactions. By understanding the way in which power operates, we are better able to enforce accountability for the decisions made by our 
governing bodies.
Key Messages 
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Background
The national health policies of developing nations are 
shaped through the engagement of local governments by a 
global network of actors involved in development assistance. 
These actors include not only bilateral and multilateral 
donor agencies, but also organizations providing technical 
assistance and policy support as well as (more recently) on-
the-ground implementing organizations, including civil 
society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Historically, this transnational aid architecture has resulted 
in policy oversight by industrialized nations and multi-lateral 
institutions, who claimed a certain authority over the policy 
decisions made within developing health systems.1-6 More 
recently, however, the idea of “aid” has matured into the 
broader concept of “development cooperation,” placing larger 
emphasis on technical support and mutual accountability 
for development outcomes than traditional definitions of 
financial-only development assistance. Despite this shift, the 
exact influence of foreign stakeholders on national policies 
remains inconclusive, and further research into this area is 
essential for determining how donors and collaborators can 
best approach low-income countries.3,7 
Numerous studies have described the economic and political 
factors involved in priority-setting8-10 and donor influence 
and coordination11-14 on policy-making in low-income 
countries. However, there remains a gap in understanding the 
provenance of power within the donor-recipient relationship, 
how it is employed by various actors, and whether there are 
factors that can increase transparency and accountability. 
Power can be understood in a multitude of ways. In 
many spheres (eg, political sociology, social psychology, 
international relations), the concept of power is typically 
thought of as the ability to influence others, or get someone 
to do something they would not otherwise do.15-19 While there 
are many other interpretations of the meaning of power, it was 
left undefined during the interviews and so the scope of this 
paper does not allow for a full examination of these alternative 
theories. As such, ‘power as influence’ will be taken as the 
operational definition of power for the purposes of this study, 
since this is the most common and likely how respondents 
conceptualized it during the interviews.
Given this definition, the present study seeks to evaluate 
how the power of both domestic stakeholders and foreign 
development agencies affects the national health policy 
agenda-setting process. The term ‘agenda-setting’ in this 
paper refers to the definition provided by Kingdon20: “The list 
of subjects or problems to which government officials, and 
people outside of government closely associated with those 
officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time.” 
The example of the United Republic of Tanzania was used in 
this study to illustrate these dynamics. 
Tanzania is well-positioned to provide insight into agenda-
setting as a dynamic international process due to its 
dependence on donor aid.6,21,22 Still, the aid climate is fraught 
with competing interests as donors have tended to prefer 
disease-specific (or “vertical”) approaches, which are easier 
to track and control in terms of expenditure for output.23,24 
Contributions made by donors often come attached to their 
priorities, so governments are not always able to allocate 
aid money to the priority areas of their choice. In fact, these 
conditions can create the perfect framework for fungibility–
recipient governments allocating their own budget away 
from the programs being targeted by earmarked funding, 
thereby sustaining aid dependency.25-27 Yet accepting aid 
implies accepting input, so African governments have been 
subject to imposed conditions for assistance and inadequate 
governance and ownership over their own health programs 
and policies for decades,28-31 and despite advances in the 
realm of development cooperation the age-old problems of 
donor conditionality, competing interests, and vertical-only 
programs persist.28,29,32-35 
In this context, little is known about power imbalance (real 
or perceived) so a candid analysis of stakeholder perspectives 
regarding aid effectiveness issues and their potential solutions 
is warranted. Furthermore, the formal, externally-facing 
process is somewhat superficial, as policy is often influenced 
through informal negotiation behind closed doors.3,35 The 
intention in this paper is, therefore, to provide an analysis 
of the power dynamics in the agenda-setting process of 
the Tanzanian health sector from the perspective of major 
stakeholders, both national and international. To do so, we 
have defined three specific objectives: (1) investigate how 
items make it onto the policy agenda; (2) determine who 
makes these decisions; and (3) elucidate whence the power 
to do so is derived. We hope to further unpack how power 
affects policy-making in aid-recipient countries and elucidate 
mechanisms for mediating these dynamics. This paper begins 
by examining the current health policy landscape in Tanzania 
and considering the interview data. From there, an analytical 
framework based on stakeholder perspectives of the policy 
process is presented, detailing the major recurrent themes 
found within the interviews. Finally, results are framed within 
Kingdon’s20 theory.
Methods 
This study employed qualitative research methodology, 
including in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key 
informants in the health sector.36 A case study design was 
chosen in order to best examine stakeholder perspectives 
and uncover complex circumstantial nuances that are nearly 
impossible to investigate using other approaches.37 
A combination of purposive expert sampling and chain-
referral sampling techniques was used.38-40 Purposive sampling 
was favored here because it allowed access to a representative 
group of experts with diverse experience and perspectives. 
The target group of experts included officials who had 
direct access to and experience in the health policy-making 
process in Tanzania. The sampling inclusion criteria were 
purposefully broad, as they aimed to include domestic actors 
as well as bilateral and multilateral agencies and non-donor 
experts in the field. Any representatives from implementing 
organizations (eg, civil society, NGOs, etc.) were excluded 
from this study. While they do attend many of the health 
sector meetings and their influence is steadily increasing, 
their participation and impact is still too variable to measure 
effectively. In addition, because they are mainly involved in 
service delivery, their role in the agenda-setting process is less 
involved. 
All interviews were conducted during the spring of 2011. 
Stakeholders who agreed to participate after initial contact 
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were interviewed. A chain-referral sampling technique was 
then used, requesting informants to identify other potential 
participants by naming colleagues or collaborators who were 
also involved in the health policy-making process. Through 
this method, several individuals were accessed with whom 
the chance of an interview would have otherwise been low. 
In total, eleven people participated, ranging from a variety of 
affiliations throughout the health sector. Three participants 
came from within the Ministry of Health (MoH), five were 
Development Partners (three bilateral and two multilateral) 
and three were non-participating experts on the process, 
of which one was a local doctor and advocate, one an 
international health donor/ consultant (characterized as a 
donor in analyses), and one a policy researcher. Due to the 
nature of policy work, few people have deep insight into 
the inner workings of the policy-making process, making it 
difficult to recruit a large sample. Thus, despite the relatively 
small number of participants there was sufficient breadth and 
diversity to offer a high degree of confidence in the sample. 
 
Data Collection
Interviews followed the guide to conducting key informant 
interviews proposed by USAID41 since this document 
is recognized as a standard reference in the field. Most 
interviews were given in person or over the phone, though 
two interviews were completed via email due to time 
constraint of the participant. For the two respondents who 
were interviewed via email, we sent a document with all of 
the major guiding questions. Based on the depth of received 
responses, we followed up with further probing or clarifying 
questions. While email is not an ideal medium for conducting 
interviews, we feel that additional insight on the policy-
making process was nevertheless gleaned and that these 
interview data added value to the study. 
Questions for the interview guide were developed based on 
a model proposed by Maykut and Morehouse,42 in which a 
systematic procedure is followed to ensure proper structure 
and breadth. Exact queries during in-person/phone interviews 
were adapted to follow the ad hoc flow of conversation and 
to best fit the informant’s area of expertise within the sector. 
Guiding questions for all participants involved the person’s/
organization’s role within the health policy process, their 
perception of priorities in health policy and programs, their 
opinion on why certain programs are brought to the table 
while others are left out, their thoughts on the interaction 
between the government and development partners, who 
they believe has the most power and influence in the agenda-
setting process, and what gives them that power. 
Data Analysis
Interview data were examined using a thematic analysis 
approach to qualitative research,43,44 whereby rigorous, 
systematic coding and categorization of major themes was 
conducted on the interview transcripts and notes. First, words 
or phrases were extracted from the transcripts and coded by 
topic. Some topics included ‘money,’ ‘priorities,’ ‘evidence,’ 
‘expertise,’ and ‘dialogue.’ Once codes were assigned, they 
were categorized into broader themes according to frequency; 
the three final emergent themes were “idea development,” 
“prioritization,” and “power.” Sub-themes also emerged within 
each category and further described the findings within each 
major theme. 
Throughout analysis, it was noted which of the sub-themes 
were mentioned by participants during discussion of each 
major theme. These were ranked chronologically; it was 
assumed that a participant’s initial response was the first 
ranked (ie, most important) and anything mentioned 
afterwards was given second, then third rank. This establishes 
which sub-themes were discussed most prominently during 
interviews and, therefore, which responses may be considered 
most important to the agenda-setting process in Tanzania. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study utilizes Kingdon’s20 stream theory to frame the 
empirical results in a theoretical context. Stream theory 
asserts that policy can only be made when three streams – 
problem, politics and policy – converge to form “policy 
windows.” This model recognizes agenda-setting as a highly 
complex process, requiring substantive evidence, support, 
timing and political will in order for an issue to be recognized 
as ‘important enough’ to be on the agenda.
The problem stream consists of how certain conditions 
become recognized as problems whose solutions take priority 
on the agenda. Indicators are often used to keep track of 
problems and their changes in pattern and magnitude. Many 
things can move a problem up the agenda, including epidemics, 
personal experiences of policy-makers, feedback from 
existing programs or policies, and budget considerations.20 
The problem stream will be used in this analysis to frame the 
question of how an idea gets taken from a stakeholder and put 
onto the policy agenda (Objective 1).
The policy stream deals with the birth and growth of policy 
proposals. For a proposal to survive, it must fulfill certain 
criteria, such as technical feasibility, public acceptance and 
reasonable cost. These proposals need to find a problem to 
become attached to and a certain amount of backing in order 
to take priority on the agenda.20 The policy stream will be 
used in this analysis to frame the question of how policies 
‘find’ a problem to back up and who is behind those policies 
(Objective 2).
The political stream deals with things such as national 
mood, consensus among organized forces and changes in 
government. In other words, the political mood must be 
right in order for an item to take precedence on the agenda.20 
The political stream will be used in this analysis to frame the 
question of how politics, both domestic and foreign, influence 
the agenda and allow certain items to move to the top of the 
list. It will also help us to understand who has the power to 
influence the decision-making process (Objective 3).
Results 
Current Health Policy Structure and Funding Mechanisms in 
Tanzania
The Government of Tanzania (GoT) is divided into Ministries, 
including the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MoHSW), which is responsible in part for devising the Health 
Sector Strategic Plan (at the time of the study, version HSSP 
III, July 2009-June 2015).45 The major stakeholders involved 
in deciding the content of these policies are the MoHSW and 
the Development Partners Group for Health (DPG), which 
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consists of 17 bilateral and multilateral agencies. Official 
policies are finalized at the Joint Annual Health Sector 
Review, where progress toward HSSP milestones is addressed. 
Alongside this process, informal technical support is acquired 
through day-to-day interactions between donors, government 
officials, and implementing organizations. 
Financial assistance from the DPG comes in two forms: 
pooled and non-pooled. Pooled funding (PF) includes general 
budget support (GBS) and health basket funds (HBF). With 
GBS, donors place a bulk sum into the national budget to be 
allocated to programs at the discretion of domestic policy-
makers. HBF are structured such that donors pool resources 
for a specific sector, in this case health, to be allocated to 
shared priorities within that sector. These PF mechanisms are 
meant to provide aid recipients with greater authority over 
their domestic budgets, assuming that they understand best 
where funding will have greatest impact.46
Non-pooled (ie, earmarked) funding (NPF), on the other 
hand, is a more donor-friendly funding modality. Most 
donors, including those who give primarily to the HBF, have 
non-pooled money set apart for funding specific vertical 
programs.47 This approach allows the least ownership to 
governments and the least alignment between donors and 
recipients.48 Nevertheless, it is also the easiest method for 
filling in gaps left by pooled or on-budget funding and, 
therefore, remains popular with donors. 
Idea Development
Across policy theory and the policy cycle framework,49 issue 
identification is regarded as the ‘first step’ towards the creation 
of health policy, so all interviews began with the question, “In 
your opinion, how does an idea become recognized and put 
onto the policy agenda?” Three prominent responses to this 
question were found. These responses were split evenly across 
all interviewees, and no particular response trend was noted 
when accounting for organizational affiliation (Table).
Essentially, (1) either an issue perceived as a problem is 
floated, (2) a person finds some value (whether monetary 
or ideological) in an idea, or (3) there is incontrovertible 
evidence that a problem requires addressing. Nevertheless, it 
was recognized by all participants that the mechanism behind 
the development of an agenda item is often the combination 
of these factors.
“…it isn’t a uni-dimensional thing where you say ‘ah ha!’ This 
is the key! This is the button that you need to push in order 
to make something happen” (Health Development Partner).
For example, problems are always pervasive, but they alone 
cannot create more than the idea for a policy. Likewise, 
evidence bolsters policy ideas but itself cannot push them 
onto the agenda. In order to transform that idea into policy, 
there needs to be a certain level of buy-in.20 
“I think a person or set of individuals or organizations who 
are determined can use that evidence and data to get [the 
idea] onto a policy agenda … and I guess at some stage … a 
critical mass of other organizations or influential players buy 
into the issue at stake and recognize its importance and need 
to be on the policy agenda” (External Stakeholder). 
A person or organization with influential position seems 
to have the greatest possibility of moving problems to the 
forefront of the agenda and everyone interviewed agreed that 
no matter whence an idea derives, it takes someone’s backing 
to move it forward.
Prioritization
Formally, the HSSP III contains the priority strategies of the 
MoHSW.45 However, several respondents admitted that policy 
issues do not necessarily bear any relation to actual needs on 
the ground. Fundamentally, priorities made at the central 
level often ignore local issues.49 In fact, global priorities 
such as the MDGs often take precedence even over national 
determination or need.50 For example, some respondents 
argued that communicable disease programs were highest 
on the agenda but that other issues (eg, health systems 
strengthening) should be of higher priority. Further, it was 
impossible to ignore the funding imperative that so often 
drives these trends. 
Table. Ranking of Responsesa
Idea Development Power
Problem Evidence People Combo Position Expertise Money Combo
MoHSW 1 - 1 2 X 2 - 1 X
MoHSW 2 1 - 2 X 1 - 2 X
MoHSW 3 1 2 3 X - 1 2 X
PF donor 1 2 - 1 X 3 2 1 X
PF donor 2 1 - 2 X 2 3 1 X
PF donor 3 - - 1 - 1 - - X
PF donor 4 - - 1 X 1 - 2 X
NPF donor 1 - 2 1 X - 1 2 X
NPF donor 2 - 1 2 X - 2 1 X
Expert 1 - - 1 - - 2 1 -
Expert 2 1 - 2 X - 1 - X
Total rank 1 4 2 5 - 3 3 5 -
Totals 14 10 26 9/11 14 16 23 10/11
Abbreviations: MoHSW, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; PF, pooled funding; NPF, non-pooled funding; Combo: X indicates that a respondent recognized 
a combination of factors that influence Idea Development or Power.
aNumbers represent rank, whereby 1 is primary response, and 2 and 3 (where relevant) are secondary and tertiary response, respectively. In terms of primary 
ranking, People and Money had the most votes. A dash means that topic was not prominently discussed during the interview. The ‘Totals’ row is counted 
backwards, with first rank getting 3 points, second rank getting 2 points and third rank getting 1 point. This shows relative weighting of importance within each 
category and more starkly identifies People (in Idea Development) and Money (in Power) as “winners” of their respective categories.
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“Sometimes things get funded because they become a high 
enough priority. Some things, they become a high priority 
because of funding” (Health Development Partner).
As this quote reflects, some items are prioritized due to 
funding alone; for example, a donor may approach a country 
with $1 million  to allocate to HIV/AIDS programs, regardless 
of whether the country feels this is the most efficient use of 
those resources. Several respondents mentioned that donors 
tend to look at the macro picture, investing mainly in areas 
where there will be directly observable output. This finding 
has also been shown in previous research and agrees with the 
respondents’ perspective.51 With vertical programs, impact 
per dollar is easy to trace whereas through the funding 
modalities of GBS or HBF, it is significantly more difficult to 
know what effect additional funding actually has on health 
outcomes.46 Furthermore, donors are beholden to their own 
governments. In this way, the intrinsic interests of the donor 
country (eg, national security, tax benefit, domestically-made 
products, etc.) can trump true needs on the ground.3 Thus, 
through funding mechanism and political support, donors 
can influence agendas and quite forcefully bring their own 
priorities to the table. 
Conversely, without funding it is impossible for governments 
to implement programs or operationalize policy strategies. 
Often the incentive driving policy change is financial and it 
would be easier for governments to simply concede to donor 
priorities rather than risk losing a substantial investment, as 
demonstrated below.
“You will want to change a policy but you don’t have funds. 
What do you do? Somebody who has funds, he has got his 
or her own priorities. So you have to welcome him or her 
so that you just get that money and then within that money 
you also make a spillover to your priorities which you have” 
(Official, MoH).
This quote also demonstrates nicely the principle of 
fungibility as a drawback to donor-driven development. 
Waddington52 argues this nicely: “A government that responds 
to earmarked donor funds by moving its own money away 
from that activity is often behaving rationally and responsibly: 
it is avoiding duplication and putting the freed-up resources to 
another use. The risk is that these new funding patterns become 
established, and that they reduce the likelihood that funding 
for the externally supported activity will continue beyond the 
period of donor earmarking.” This fungibility perpetuates aid 
dependency and detracts from the overall efficiency of donor 
funding.
Policy Dialogue for Mediating Prioritization
It is clear that donors influence governmental priorities 
through the money they provide, and financial restraints 
obviously play a huge role in the negotiating power of 
governments to defend their priorities, especially with 
earmarked funding. 
“I think [governments] can negotiate, but as a government 
they have to make a decision; that if they are lacking in 
resources and the amount of money that is on the table is 
quite significant, and if that is the difference between being 
able to put $12 per person into a health system instead 
of $10 per person into a health system then it’s hard for a 
responsible minister in charge of the health of the country to 
say no” (External Stakeholder).
When funding enters the country as off-budget project 
support, it is not necessarily designated to the priorities of 
the Ministry,53,54 so negotiation is more difficult when there is 
contention between priorities.10,50 
“…to have policy discussions with someone who is just 
sitting there with a lot of money behind him or her and then 
having funny ideas about running the sector, it’s not really 
something which creates the right atmosphere for productive 
collaboration and policy dialogue” (Official, MoH).
With the PF modalities of GBS and HBF on the other hand, 
the intention is for donors to adopt and support the priorities 
set out by the government so they may not feel comfortable 
arguing a point if they disagree with the MoHSW.55
“…the general budget support and basket funding are just… 
people will not have that hard discussion, people will not cut 
the Ministry off, it’s taken 10 years and people are finally 
just throwing their hands in the air rather than having that 
technical discussion about what worked and didn’t work” 
(Health Development Partner).
Policy dialogue, when done correctly, can be a boon to 
stakeholders when there is contention between priorities. 
However, this is an intricate dance and requires patience and 
compromise to be most effective in mediating priorities. 
Power
The true challenge in policy-making is indeed that power can 
manifest itself in various ways and it is difficult to reconcile 
these into a coherent policy-making strategy.17,56 This 
heterogeneity is demonstrated in the responses on power given 
by our interviewees (Table). Several respondents believed that 
the key power base behind decisions made in the country 
comes from within the MoHSW. Others argued that while the 
ultimate decision does indeed lie within the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry, the major source of power stemmed from technical 
expertise and evidence. The third and largest group asserted 
that money is the main source of power in decision-making. 
Of those who contended that the main source of power comes 
from within the Ministry, only one was a MoHSW official, 
while the other two were development partners. Both of the 
development partners in this group most heavily supported 
PF mechanisms, demonstrating that PF leads to greater 
ownership for governments. Naturally, no policy decision can 
be made in Tanzania without the signature of the Minister of 
Health, obliging the MoHSW, at least formally, with decision-
making power. Nevertheless, other stakeholders (namely 
donors) can influence these decisions by pushing the MoHSW 
to consider other options. 
The second largest group considered technical expertise the 
greatest source of power. This group consisted of one NPF 
donor, one Ministry official and one outside expert. The 
donor argued that while the ultimate decision whether to 
sign lies with the Ministry, donors or other actors can come 
together, “with conclusive data and a body of international 
experience… and so a concerted effort by a number of 
partners will tend to cave in what is considered ill-conceived 
opposition.” For example, one respondent told a story about a 
development agency that managed to force through a specific 
brand of birth control because they not only had the money 
behind them, but also good evidence that theirs was the 
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best for the situation. Hence, a strong argument with robust 
evidence-based rationale can sway opposing stakeholders and 
their interests. Likewise, if there is a disagreement, backing 
an idea with incontrovertible data can help ‘win over’ your 
opponents.57,58 
The third major source of decision-making power was 
financial. The group that upheld this argument extended 
across participants, regardless of affiliation. Only two 
respondents (one PF bilateral donor and one external 
stakeholder) denied that money has any sort of substantial 
impact on power. All other respondents, even if it was not 
their chief argument, recognized that money has at least some 
influence in the policy-making process. For example, after 
discussing technical expertise as the main source of power 
with one respondent, the following conversation ensued:
“Investigator: Then how much [power] would you say is 
attributed to money?
Respondent: A great deal.
Investigator: So if you have both, you pretty much win?
Respondent: Yes” (Health Development Partner).
Money can create a natural power imbalance between 
stakeholders, allowing donor interests to prevail over those 
of the recipient as a result of financial limitations.24,54 As 
many respondents cited, this is what happened with large 
Global Health Initiatives such as the Global Fund and the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) with 
respect to HIV and other communicable disease programs. 
Due to the money allocated through these channels, vertical 
programs have had a great deal of leverage on the agenda.50 
Fungibility is also strongest with project funding, as 
demonstrated here: 
“…we cannot blame the government, I mean, they have 
so many other needs that whenever there’s funding for 
something, you would be stupid to invest your own money 
when others are ready to fund” (Health Development 
Partner).
In this way, money can be an enormous factor in determining 
which items make it to the top of the agenda and how the 
decision to fund various programs and services is made. 
Discussion 
Analytical Framework
The analytical framework (Figure) was developed based on 
transcript analyses to characterize the key messages found 
across the interviews. These were placed into a ‘map’ of 
interrelationships to provide a visualization of the data. It 
is obvious here that the major stakeholders in the process 
are those with money, position, or expertise, though 
these characteristics overlap in many actors. In terms of 
prioritization, donor interests and recipient governments’ 
limitations appear to be in opposition, though this can by 
mediated through policy dialogue, which arguably engenders 
greater harmonization in agenda-setting.
Kingdon’s Stream Theory
Links between data analysis and policy theory were made 
only after full independent categorization of the data. The 
theoretical context can help clarify how certain programs and 
services are prioritized and who has the power to push these 
items through.
Idea Development and Stream Theory
In relationship to the analytical framework, Kingdon’s20 
problem stream matches most closely to Idea Development. 
The problem stream determines how certain conditions 
can be met in order for an item to necessitate space on the 
Figure. Analytical Framework.
Analytical Framework: Definitions
Idea Development: How an idea is recognized and put onto the policy agenda. Problem: An item that has been flagged as worth considering, 
through media, a landmark event, etc. Evidence: Undeniable proof of a trend, through research findings or health indicators. Person or Organization: 
Someone who has substantial influence (eg, Minister of Health, representative of a large donor organization, etc). Prioritization: Which items  are 
considered of highest importance on the agenda. Donor Interests: Items on the agenda that have a particular pull for donors. Recipient Limitations: 
Restrictions of recipient governments due to lack of funds/expertise. Policy Dialogue: Discourse between recipient, donor, and third party (where 
relevant) with the intent of harmonizing agenda items. Power: Influence of a stakeholder in determining agenda items or swaying popular opinion. 
Influential Position: Status or title that gives natural authority over decision-making. Technical Expertise: Ability to supply evidence to support an 
argument due to topical knowledge. Financial Incentives: Financial backing of an idea or agenda item.
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policy agenda. Various channels (notably problems, evidence, 
and people/organizations) may be used to push something 
forward, but no single factor is sufficient in itself to ensure 
that an idea will be put on the agenda. 
Prioritization and Stream Theory
Prioritization can be viewed through the lens of Kingdon’s20 
policy stream. Policies that are brought to the table by both 
donors and recipients can shape the agenda, and the dialogue 
that occurs between these actors in order to support one 
policy over another is a major factor in whether an item 
reaches the agenda. This stream also encompasses the way 
certain policies “find” a problem to back up and who is behind 
those policies. Kingdon mentions the necessity of having 
‘advocates’ for a policy, and this was seen throughout the 
interviews as respondents noted that without the substantial 
backing of certain parties and the policy dialogue that flows 
between them, agenda items are more likely to get lost 
amongst the numerous ideas that are constantly being floated 
for discussion.
Power and Stream Theory
Power can be viewed through Kingdon’s20 political stream. 
While it is not possible to conclusively declare what gives 
the power to set agendas or make decisions, it can be stated 
that it almost always takes a combination of factors (whether 
money, expertise, or influential position) to employ that 
power. In addition, it is clear that politics – both domestic 
and international – can heavily influence the trends of health 
policy in developing countries50 by using the influence of 
globally recognized positions of authority, ability to mobilize 
resources, and capacity to support claims with strong evidence 
to influence policy. 
Conclusion
This paper sought to identify stakeholder perspectives on 
the power dynamics of health policy agenda-setting in 
Tanzania. The analytical map, which helps to visualize the 
interview data, complements Kingdon’s20 theory, which 
provides a framework through which we can view the process 
and its major influences. Kingdon’s theory was built on the 
understanding of policy-making in the United States, and 
while many of his concepts are relevant to international policy 
there are factors in aid-recipient countries (eg, the donor-
recipient relationship itself) that are not so easily explained 
by his theory. To complement the multiple streams, one can 
envision the forces of financial incentives, technical expertise, 
and influential position acting as agents that redirect the 
streams towards or away from the others, and, therefore, 
the final ‘policy window.’ In this way, we can begin to more 
fully understand – both theoretically and practically – the 
components of agenda-setting and use this knowledge to 
inform coordination efforts in aid-recipient countries. 
When asked how an item makes it onto the policy agenda 
(Objective 1), most respondents agreed that a person or 
people needed to back an idea. The ability to combine this 
support with evidence made success more likely. The route to 
the agenda, however, was not so clear cut, and the priorities of 
policy-makers differ depending on affiliation. Various factors 
could shape these priorities, including emergent or existing 
problems, personal stake, political interests, or financial 
incentives, so there is often not consensus in the agenda-
setting process. 
One major consideration in the policy-making process is 
who has the ability to make policy decisions (Objective 2). 
As demonstrated in the results, funding can be redirected 
as circumstances so demand, as is often the case with donor 
earmarks for NPF. Although the Sector-Wide Approach 
has demonstrated some clear benefits in the objectives of 
ownership and alignment, donor-driven policy in Tanzania 
is still overwhelmingly present.13,59 This idea is supported by 
a broad base of literature stating that significant aid flows 
from donor organizations largely influence the national 
strategies of recipient countries.2,3,10,11,32,35,49,50 This does not 
necessarily mean that donors always have the largest say, 
or that they are the ones who make the final decisions, but 
there is clearly an imbalanced interplay between donor and 
recipient. Ownership of development priorities is, therefore, 
muddled and negotiations can often be laden with unhelpful 
backchannel arguments, leading to an increase in fungibility 
when donors get their way. 
The power to make decisions (Objective 3) derives largely 
from one of three factors: financial backing, technical 
expertise, or influential position. One interesting finding was 
that PF and NPF donors responded differently on questions 
regarding power, as seen in Table. Both of the PF donors who 
mentioned influential position as the greatest source of power 
specifically defined this as the MoHSW during interviews, 
demonstrating that these donors concede their power to 
support the priorities of the recipient government. One of 
these even vehemently stated that money has no bearing on 
policy discussions between donor and recipient. This would 
lead to the conclusion that the ideology surrounding PF 
modalities (ie, ownership and alignment) restrains certain 
donors from using their inherent power to push their own 
agendas. 
A second point of interest on this topic is that having the 
greatest amount of power in the agenda-setting process is 
increased by the ability to somehow combine influential 
position and technical expertise if you are not the one with 
the money. This finding has strong policy implications, 
arguing that greater emphasis on domestic-based research 
and evaluation of health indicators, service delivery and 
current policy strategies is essential. In this way, recipient 
governments would be encouraged to use their own data-
based evidence, leveling the playing field by bringing domestic 
technical expertise to the table. 
One missing link in this story might well be the effective 
implementation of policy dialogue. It is quite obvious 
that communication and compromise will enhance the 
effectiveness of aid and development cooperation overall, 
yet the ability to do so is hampered by power imbalance 
and varying degrees of consensus regarding priorities.50,60 
Adhering to the ideal of national ownership should not mean 
that donors are discouraged from expressing their opinions 
over policies if they disagree. Likewise, approaching a country 
with earmarked funding should not equate to donor interests 
steamrolling those of the recipient. As explained through 
Kingdon,20 agendas are not set arbitrarily. It takes a perfect 
storm of political will, policy support and the evidence of a 
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problem for issues to reach an agenda. Policy dialogue should 
be used to mediate these conflicting ideas and data-based 
decision-making should trump many of the other factors. 
Limitations of this paper include sampling issues and overall 
generalizability. The sample size was limited, though as 
previously expressed it was felt that there was sufficient breadth 
to not substantially skew the results. Likewise, the sampling 
technique created a natural limitation in who participated, 
though this paper does not claim to have taken into account 
the influence of every stakeholder. Second, this study was 
conducted on the policy-making process in Tanzania only, 
affecting the possibility to confidently generalize to other 
low-income countries. However, it would be interesting to 
examine whether the results found in this study would be 
reproducible, and similar research should be applied within 
and between other aid-recipient countries to analyze which 
mechanisms most contribute to successful health outcomes, 
reduce aid dependency, and fully promote ownership and 
sustainability. This would also allow development partners 
to better coordinate aid, plan programs, and reform health 
systems to embolden mutually-agreed, evidence-based 
priorities.
Aid-recipient governments certainly do not have all the 
knowledge necessary to fix their health systems, and donors 
undoubtedly have a wealth of valuable input to provide. 
The key for progressing in effective policy-making is to 
foster working relationships that facilitate and emphasize 
meaningful policy dialogue, with the aim of setting agendas 
in consensus, utilizing the best available evidentiary support, 
and understanding fully how power dynamics affect not only 
the process, but also the outcomes, of national health policies. 
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